Posts Categorized: Learning lessons
A Toxic Culture?
February 14 2020
In March 2017 PC Keith Palmer was killed while defending Parliament from a terrorist. In August 2019 PC Andrew Harper was killed while investigating a suspected burglary. These are only 2 of the 50 police officers killed between 1990-2010. Few of us face the risks ordinary police officers run. This does not excuse what is set out below. It does explain why it is so necessary, if their work and sacrifices are to be worthwhile and the public gets the policing it is entitled to, that the issues raised below be properly addressed.
What follows is not a comprehensive list of every scandal affecting the police. But it is an overview of their range over five decades.
- 1972-1977: Sir Robert Mark’s campaign to root out corrupt officers within the Flying Squad and CID, resulting in more than 500 officers being dismissed or “resigned”. He memorably stated: “a good police force is one that catches more crooks than it employs”.
- 1974-1989: The West Midlands Serious Crime Squad – eventually wound up after allegations of incompetence, malpractice and abuse of power, leading to over 100 cases collapsing or being overturned on appeal. An investigation into its activities led to some disciplinary action but no prosecutions, a decision for which the DPP (Barbara Mills) was severely criticised.
- 1970’s: The activities of various police forces in the Irish miscarriage of justice cases – the Guildford Four (1974), the Birmingham Six (1975), the Maguire Seven (1976).
- 1978-1982: Operation Countryman – an investigation into corruption within the Met and City of London Police in the late 1970’s. Information was released in 2018 about efforts made by the Met and the DPP (Sir Thomas Hetherington) to cover up the scale of wrongdoing and obstruct the investigation by the Hampshire and Dorset police.
- 1979: The death of Blair Peach during an Anti-Nazi League demonstration against the National Front in Southall. In 2010 a police report stated it was likely that a Metropolitan Police officer “struck the fatal blow” and attributed “grave suspicion” to one unnamed officer, who may also have been involved in a cover-up with two colleagues.
- 1981: Operation Swamp, the subsequent Brixton riots and the Scarman report into how the police used their “stop and search” and other powers. Numerous recommendations were made.
- 1980’s – 2010: South Yorkshire Police’s failures in the Rotherham child exploitation scandal. The Jay Report described how the police failed to investigate adequately or at all the reports they were receiving over at least a decade of child sexual grooming.
- 1989: The Hillsborough stadium tragedy. Two reports – the 1990 Taylor Report and the 2012 report by the Independent Panel – described the extent of South Yorkshire Police’s negligence, attempts to shift blame on others and pervert the course of justice.
- 1993: The investigation into Stephen Lawrence’s murder and the resulting 1999 Macpherson Inquiry which found that many Scarman recommendations had not been implemented. Macpherson, unlike Scarman, described the police as “institutionally racist”. Subsequently it was revealed the police had spied on the Lawrence family.
- 2003-2020: The failures of the Greater Manchester Police in relation to Operation Augusta and child sexual exploitation, described in the Newsam report published this week. The report’s statement that: “The authorities knew many were being subjected to the most profound abuse and exploitation but did not protect them from the perpetrators. This is a depressingly familiar picture and has been seen in many other towns and cities across the country.” could apply to a number of places and police forces round the country.
- 2006-2011: Allegations were made during the News International inquiry that the police were selling confidential information to journalists. This was to be looked at in the second stage of the Leveson Inquiry which never went ahead.
- 2009: The death of newspaper seller, Ian Tomlinson, as a result of police assault during G-20 summit protests.
- 2011: It’s revealed that various undercover policemen had infiltrated environmental groups for a number of years, entering into deceitful relationships with activists and fathering children. In 2015 the Met apologized to women “tricked into relationships” over 25 years, closed the units and made financial settlements of circa £3 million. An “Undercover Policing Inquiry” into “appalling practices” in undercover policing was set up. It has yet to report.
- 2012 onwards: Cleveland Police has 5 Chief Constables in 6 years, the first in this list being dismissed for deceit and misconduct. In 2019 it is put into special measures following an independent report describing it as “inadequate” in all fields, “directionless, rudderless and clueless”, “putting the public at risk” with some officers “not acting with honesty, integrity and competence“.
- 2014: Operation Midland into child abuse allegations made by Carl Beech against politicians and others is launched. In 2019 following his conviction on multiple counts of perverting the course of justice, the Henriques Report identifies extensive failings in the original investigation.
- 2015: Police Scotland are criticised by a judge for breaching data privacy laws and the ECHR when spying on journalists and their communications with their sources. Similar breaches were committed by Cleveland Police.
- 2018: The Met’s anti-corruption unit is under investigation for corruption in relation to allegations of assault, racism, child abuse and child grooming.
- 2018: Cliff Richard is paid £400,000 by the South Yorkshire Police for its behaviour over the raid on his home in relation to historic child sex abuse allegations, including informing the BBC about the raid.
- 2005 to date: there have been 4 Metropolitan Police Commissioners. Ian Blair resigned after falling out with the London Mayor; his successor resigned because of his links with one of the journalists implicated in phone hacking; Hogan-Howe lasted 6 years. Under his leadership Operation Midland is set up and people arrested under Operation Yewtree and bailed for lengthy periods without charge, a practice later banned. His replacement in 2017 is Cressida Dick, the senior policewoman in charge when a blameless electrician was killed in 2005 following terror attacks.
- 2020: The Met refers itself to the police watchdog for its failure to act on recommendations made by Sir Richard Henriques to investigate two others for perverting the course of justice in relation to abuse allegations arising from Operation Midland.
- 2020: A review led by a former Met Police Commissioner states that the police are unable to deal with a huge increase in fraud cases.
- 2020: This month a report by HMICFRS on all 43 police forces states that the public has lost faith, having “rumbled” that the police are unable to investigate most crimes. The charging rate in the year to March 2019 fell to 7.8% of all reported crimes in England and Wales.
It is a dismal list. It could be twice as long.
To a financial investigator, this picture is very familiar. Despite innumerable inquiries, changes in the law, disciplinary proceedings, recommendations, new procedures, training, apologies, compensation paid, some prosecutions and that perennial favourite – “lessons have been learnt” – bad, criminal behaviour (which all the people doing it would clearly have known was wrong) and incompetence have repeatedly occurred in forces all over the country over decades. Not one or two “rotten apples”; whole orchards of them. There has been a culture of poor leadership, cover-up or the truth only coming out many years later and of other key agencies turning a blind eye, aiding and abetting or failing to set or demand high standards of probity and professionalism.
Above all, there has been a failure to ask why such problems keep on happening, despite all the remedial steps taken and all the apparent learning of all those lessons.
It is irrelevant that there are many policemen, possibly even the majority, who don’t behave in this way. The same could be said of banking. The professionalism, hard work and good name of the honest good guys are tarnished by the bad, useless ones. The bad drive out – and demoralise – the good.
Policing depends on consent. Trust is essential to that consent. Scandals and incompetence erode that trust. How can our cherished system of policing work then?
Perhaps – like banking – it is time to realise that there is something systemic and deep-rooted and toxic in police culture which allows or encourages or does not stop officers from behaving badly. Perhaps – like banking – it is time to make the hard cultural changes needed if training and rules are to work. Perhaps – unlike banking – it is time for senior leaders to take real responsibility not merely talk about it. Perhaps – like banking – it is time to realise that even successful or vital sectors or professions can in reality be really rather more second-rate than we like to pretend. Perhaps we should stop deluding ourselves that our key institutions are as good as we sometimes rather vaingloriously claim. The police are not the only body of which this could be said, of course.
Law and order are the most basic functions of the state. But the police should not be treated as a sacred cow. A comprehensive, dispassionate and ruthless look at how the police operate and real tough action to change it for the better are needed.
What are the chances?
June 28 2019
2016: Tracey McDermott, the then acting CEO of the FCA:-
“I’m not saying in 2001 I would have seen a failure. But one of the roles of a regulator is to have the confidence to ask what you think might be stupid questions. This is a big task for a 25-year-old faced with masters of the universe. The people who live and breathe this stuff, who speak in basis points, will say you don’t understand because you are in some ivory tower as a regulator. Making sure FCA people have that resilience is very important.”
26 June 2019: Andrew Bailey (CEO of the FCA) when questioned by the Treasury Select Committee admits that, despite having concerns about the Woodford funds since February 2018 and the various risk warnings it had given, the FCA had been taken by surprise by the wave of redemption requests and their effect on the fund. He admitted that the fund had been guilty of “regulatory arbitrage” and ‘sailing close to the wind”.
The FCA’s Chairman said that the European funds regime had created a “perfect storm” that allowed the Woodford situation to escalate, but that there should have been a more incisive cutting through to the key issues. You don’t say.
27 June 2019: Mark Carney (Governor of the Bank of England) talking to the Treasury Select Committee about the issues raised by Neil Woodford and his various funds:-
“These funds are built on a lie, which is that you can have daily liquidity for assets that fundamentally aren’t liquid.”
The FCA’s answers do not impress the Committee’s Chair. “Doesn’t anyone at the FCA actually read the newspapers and listen to what’s going on in the industry?”
Evidently, developing the confidence to ask any questions, let alone stupid ones, or even learning to cut through to the key issues are harder tasks than the FCA thought. Still, after three years you’d have thought some lessons would have been learnt. If only this one: curiosity is one of the most underrated but most necessary qualities for a regulator to have.
Better Late than Never
May 31 2019
The recent decisions by the FCA to fine UBS and Goldman Sachs £27.6 million and £34.3 million for transaction reporting failures going back to November 2007 and HBOS for its failure to inform the regulator of its suspicions that fraud was occurring in its Impaired Assets team – again in 2007 – is a reminder that the failings of long ago still have bite. All three firms will doubtless be relieved to put these investigations, finally, behind them. Systems changes will have been made, extensive remediation measures taken, training given and few, if any, of the people involved will still be in the organisations. Sighs of relief all round. After all, the past is another country. They did things differently then.
And yet, 12 years from the events in question to enforcement is a generation, probably two, in City terms. There will be people now starting their banking careers who were in short trousers when these events were happening. It will be all too easy for them to think that there is little for them to learn from what went on in these cases. After all, haven’t all the lessons already been learnt? They would be wrong.
For those training the next generation, the challenge is to make the lessons to be learnt from these past cases real for people working today – if the same dismal cycle is not to be repeated in future. Perhaps too the FCA might realise that the pursuit of perfection in their investigations risks making their ultimate outcomes little more than historical accounts of past misdeeds rather than a quick sharp reminder to those involved and their contemporaries of the perils of not taking their obligations seriously. Delaying justice for too long risks not just denying it but blunting its wider impact.