April 10 2024

Scandals and misconduct do not come out of nowhere. When people misbehave there is usually a clue, often more than one, usually ignored (even if carefully collected and correctly filed) or hand-waved away as unimportant (see the Angiolini Report on Wayne Couzens, for instance). The same applies to scandals involving organisations and actions (or a lack of action) by many people. There were warnings; there were whistleblowers; people were told. Coupled with this is a failure to take this information seriously, a failure to investigate properly or at all, a determination to ignore evidence and, often, a decision to remove, ignore or badmouth those raising concerns. Out of these two ingredients are our scandals made.

This is the case in the Post Office scandal and – this is critical – very much earlier than 2013 when the independent investigators, Second Sight, were telling senior managers some uncomfortable truths. The understandable focus on this period is making us forget there were explicit warnings of the issues much earlier on – and to people right at the top of the Post Office. This became clear from Alan Bates’ evidence yesterday at the Williams Inquiry (during the morning hearing – here – from about 1 hour in until 1:52).

Two key pieces of evidence came out.

The Letter

The first was a letter he sent in August 2003 to the then Chair of the Royal Mail, Allan Leighton. (The Post Office was still part of Royal Mail.) Mr Bates’s contract had been terminated following extensive correspondence with managers from 2000 onwards in which he pointed out that “the Horizon system cannot be relied upon to give 100% accurate figures” (a letter dated 19 December 2000), he could not check the data being produced by Horizon (nor seemingly could anyone else) and therefore could not be legally held liable for so-called shortfalls if the transaction data in Horizon could not be checked and verified. He also says that he was not the only one facing problems. In that correspondence, copied to the Chair, he described – in essence – the two problems which are at the heart of the scandal:

(1) Horizon data was unreliable; and

(2) the Post Office did not properly understand its own contracts with subpostmasters. It acted as if all losses were the responsibility of the subpostmasters whereas in fact it was only ones caused by their negligence, carelessness or error. This faulty understanding lay behind the decisions to prosecute or bankrupt some subpostmasters, such as Lee Castleton.

It was Mr Justice Fraser’s judgment in the Bates litigation in 2019 which spelt out how right Alan Bates had been: Horizon was unreliable and the Post Office’s understanding of its own contracts was wrong. It should not have taken 16 years, two exceptionally long, detailed judgments and endless, ruinously expensive litigation for this to be established. Allan Leighton was alerted to these issues in 2003: a full decade before the Second Sight investigation. Various Post Office managers from 2000 onwards had also been told repeatedly of both the Horizon problems and the contractual issues but had never addressed them.

Why did Mr Bates contact the Chair? In his own words:

“I thought it was well worth trying to write to the Chairman to make him aware of what was going on because he may well have not known…..hoping that he might be able to undertake some sort of review into it and look into the case for us and take it on board a little more seriously.“

“I can’t force them to read it but if you don’t write to them then they’ll never know.“

Allan Leighton could not have been expected to look into these matters himself. But there should have been a proper investigation into what Mr Bates was saying. There wasn’t. The inadequacy of the response makes this clear. It was simply a justification of the decision taken, a polite “we’re right, you’re wrong; no we’re not going to explain anything or answer your questions.” brush-off. In part, this was because there was no proper investigations team within Royal Mail. What was called that was in reality a debt recovery team. It had neither the authority, capability, willingness or independence of mind to investigate concerns or complaints to the organisation.

It is worth noting that when asked why he thought his contract had been terminated Mr Bates said:

“They didn’t like me standing up to them, in the first instance; they were finding it awkward; and I don’t think they could answer these questions. I think they had a feeling I was going to carry on in a similar vein going forward.“

His answer summarises succinctly why whistleblowers are mistreated by organisations, why challenge is so unwelcome and why an investigation, so that you can answer the questions put to you, is so essential. Any person, any organisation, any sort of body or ideology unwilling to be challenged is a red flag, a sign of a poor culture and one well on its way to becoming a toxic and, often, a dangerous one.

The Loss Authorisation Form

Mr Bates had rolled over in a suspense account the shortfalls he could not explain. After 2 years, the Post Office wrote this sum off using a Loss Authorization Form which stated that the loss “was attributable to Horizon system/software/equipment/training failure.” It was a standard template, a document which came to light in disclosure. By 2002 the Post Office had in place a form – and procedure – for writing off sums attributable to a variety of causes, one of which was the “Horizon system“. Yet it continued to claim that Horizon was “robust” etc., (what does “robust” even mean here?) even while it had recognized from an early stage that losses might be caused by it and be written off. Look not at what organisations say but at what they do – especially when they think no-one is looking.

Had there been any sort of proper investigation into what Mr Bates had been saying, had his letter to the Chair been taken seriously – as should have happened – the scandal would very likely never have happened, or not to the extent it has.

The majority of the miscarriages of justice happened long before Ms Vennells became CEO and for a long time after Allan Leighton had been informed of the problems.

As Jason Beer KC said, in August 2003:

“many people had yet to be terminated, many people were yet to be prosecuted, many people were yet to be convicted and many people were yet to go to prison.”

When you strip away the reports, the millions of documents, the interviews, the evidence, the court cases and judgments, the lawyers, the documentaries, the dramas, remember this. At the heart of all these scandals – whether in the police, the post office, the NHS, childrens’ homes or elsewhere – are people (often some of the most vulnerable) whose lives have been ruined, people who have been harmed, people who have suffered and whose suffering could and should have been stopped if only those who had the power and the responsibility to do so had paid attention to the clues waved under their noses and acted. This failure to do so and the accompanying lies – by so many bodies from government down – has degraded trust in our public and private institutions. There is still far too much resistance and denial by those responsible for the problems. It will be quite the effort to rebuild that trust. There is little sign that the scale of the task or its overriding necessity are fully understood.

Photo by Alexander Lyashkov on Unsplash

January 12 2024

Why has no-one called  the subpostmasters whistleblowers?

My GRIP article here –

The victims of the UK Post Office scandal are whistleblowers – and should be recognised as such

The full article is below –

The UK Post Office subpostmasters have been called many things over the years:

• thieves, crooks and fraudsters (often garnished with appalling racial epithets) by Post Office investigators and managers;
• victims by those campaigning for them, including MPs;
• heroes by some; and
• the “skint little people” by the dramatist, Gwyneth Hughes, telling their story in the recent TV drama.

But the one thing they have not been called, surprisingly because this is what they indubitably were, is “whistleblowers”.

Why has no one called them this? They did not call themselves that. They did not send an email marked “Whistleblowing”. They did not refer to any internal policy or press a button on the corporate website marked “Making a Whistleblowing Report” (even assuming the Post Office had such a procedure).

They weren’t even Post Office employees. But the substance of what they did was to blow the whistle on a flawed accounting system. And, subsequently, on flawed, badly understood contracts (see the March 2019 Bates Common Issues judgment) and the behavior of its internal investigators and lawyers, whose conduct is currently being reviewed by the Williams Inquiry.

It is all too easy for organisations, focused on drafting whistleblowing procedures, to forget what whistleblowing is for.

It is the substance of the message which is what makes something a whistleblowing. Not the how of its communication or the status of the messenger. If someone is telling you that something is – or may be – wrong, then rather than worry about how to categorize them, or what legal arguments you can use to justify ignoring them, you need to listen, investigate and not go after the messenger.

It is the difference between taking a “tick-the-box / does this fit the procedure?” approach and understanding what the point of whistleblowing is and why it matters.

The Post Office did not treat the subpostmasters as whistleblowers because this would have required it to accept that there was something which needed investigating – and doing so properly. It would also have made it impossible for it to demand the money it wanted. But at some more fundamental level it simply did not recognise that this was what was happening.

This is not surprising. It is all too easy for organizations, focused on drafting whistleblowing or, as they are often now called, “Speak Up” procedures, on understanding the finer points of the latest EU Whistleblowing Directive, if they have operations within the EU, or regulatory requirements or the precise remit of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 to forget what whistleblowing is for.

It is not meant to be an intellectual legal categorization exercise for employment lawyers or HR personnel. Too often it devolves into an assessment of whether an individual has brought themselves within scope of the relevant law and what legal arguments might be used against them to protect the organization from an employment claim and the payment of damages.

Nor is it meant to be another process or procedure to be proudly displayed to one’s regulator or talked about in the Annual Report, a token of how “transparent” and “compliant” the organisation likes to present itself as being.

One of the hardest things for organizations – especially large ones – to do is see what is really going on in their organization. Partly it is because there is so much information and, paradoxically, despite its quantity it can too often be silo’ed. But partly it is because the information collected or focused on is about what is going well: profits made, targets met, new customers, new contracts etc …

But what you also need to know is what is not going well: complaints, demands for information from regulators or other outside bodies, legal actions, internal investigations, disciplinaries, grievances, reasons for departures, system problems, faults, monitoring reports, whistleblowing claims and so on. All of these are signs that the organization’s health is not what it should be.

Whistleblowing reports do not always come neatly packaged as such. The person raising an issue may not even realise that that is what they are doing. They may only have part of the picture, or get some of it wrong, or not understand the implications. Or miss out key facts which can only be teased out when they are spoken to. They may do so for self-interested reasons.

But none of that really matters. A concern raised – in whatever context – is a warning that something is or may be going wrong. It is a chance to look at it properly before it becomes a crisis to be managed. It is something to be welcomed because it tells you something that you might not otherwise have spotted. Or it helps you connect seemingly random bits of information and understand what that tells you.

Who tells you and what their motives may be are less important than what they are telling you, certainly until you have investigated and established the facts in a robust and reliable manner.

What organizations need is the skill to realize that they are being given clues needing proper investigation. And the sense to realise that this – proper investigation and resolution of the concerns raised – is the point of having all these procedures, processes, policies, training, Whistleblowing Champions and the rest.

Those subpostmasters were whistleblowers. It is a mark of how poorly understood the importance and purpose of whistleblowing is that it has taken two decades after the first whistleblowing legislation, passed at around the same time the Horizon scandal started, ironically enough, for their concerns to start being properly understood and addressed.

Photo: author’s own.

October 24 2023

And no, it’s not just a beautifully written policy. To find out more see my latest column for GRIP here –

What every good whistleblowing function needs

Photo by Emily Morter on Unsplash