June 1 2024

Part Two

Remember that interview question where you are asked to describe a weakness of yours and you have to find something to say which seems to answer while in reality complimenting yourself?

That was the approach adopted by Paula Vennells in her evidence to the Williams Inquiry. Yes – all these bad things happened which shouldn’t have; steps were not taken which should have been: questions were not asked which should have been; briefings, reports, documents and legal advice were not given to her and so, sadly, not read. But this was the way things were done in the Post Office, as if this entity had a mind of its own and paid no heed to the person appointed to run it, as if its chief executive had no authority to change anything nor ultimate responsibility for how it was run. She gave the impression of treating Post Office processes as if they were the equivalent of the laws of physics.

Look, she was saying, it was only her fault because she was a good person who “loved” the Post Office and was too “trusting”, apparently, of people (mainly lawyers and IT professionals) who did not tell her the truth. It was – in essence – the “I’m too stupid to be held responsible” defence. Pity the poor trusting CEO who did not understand IT and was unable to write an email asking for a briefing. (Quite why someone so ignorant of IT was put in charge of a company heavily reliant on IT systems is yet more proof that ignorance is no bar to promotion if you’re willing to shed all ethical and professional standards to achieve it while making sure to include the latest management buzz words in whatever flannel you utter.)

What made this approach risible was that barely had she started giving evidence than she undermined it with her own statements. Well before the first break on her first day, she stated that:

• People sometimes criticised her because she was “too curious”
• She had a campaign saying that “Bad news is good news”. What bad news she did want to hear and why she never asked to be properly briefed was left hanging.

It was not just Vennells who adopted this strategy: so did her predecessors and Chairs of the Royal Mail / Post Office – Allan Leighton, Alan Cook, David Miller, David Smith, Sir Michael Hodgkinson – all of whom were also remarkably uncurious about what it did and seemingly unable to ask the simplest of questions, other than how much they would be paid for this passive “nothing to do with me, guv” approach to their responsibilities.

It is worth remembering that the bulk of the prosecutions happened while these people were in charge, long before Ms Vennells joined. Worth noting that concerns about what was happening to subpostmasters were being raised from 2000 onwards and were escalated to the then Chair, Allan Leighton, in August 2003. As Jason Beer KC put it, at this date –

“many people had yet to be terminated, many people were yet to be prosecuted, many people were yet to be convicted and many people were yet to go to prison.” 

What Ms Vennells defence strategy also did is suggest that the worst miscarriage of justice in English history was simply an unfortunate by-product of having ineffective, but well-meaning, people in charge. It could have happened to anyone. None of it was the result of considered, deliberate actions and failures to act by them. If true, this would be bad enough.

But it is not true, is it? And the fact that it is still being put forward at this latest stage and after all that we’ve learnt is evidence that not only do these executives not grasp the enormity of what they have been responsible for but of their contempt for the entire inquiry process. (See also the tenor of their apologies.) It is an attempt to disguise the fact that what happened was the likely and predictable consequence of priorities chosen, of actions taken to implement those priorities and decisions about how those actions would be implemented.

What prompted those actions is the subject of Part Three.

Photo by Annie Spratt on Unsplash

May 30 2024

This is the first of three articles reflecting on the evidence given by Paula Vennells and others in the Williams Inquiry.

Part One

Listening to Ms Vennells and other Post Office witnesses at the Williams Inquiry, I was reminded of the Report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, published in June 2013. This was at the same time that – at the latest – Vennells and others became aware of the likely miscarriages of justice which had occurred and embarked on a series of steps which sought to keep this knowledge from anyone outside a small Post Office circle for the best part of the next 8 years.

This passage, in particular, resonated: –

“One of the most dismal features of the banking industry to emerge from our evidence was the striking limitation on the sense of personal responsibility and accountability of the leaders within the industry for the widespread failings and abuses over which they presided. Ignorance was offered as the main excuse. It was not always accidental. Those who should have been exercising supervisory or leadership roles benefited from an accountability firewall between themselves and individual misconduct, and demonstrated poor, perhaps deliberately poor, understanding of the front line. Senior executives were aware that they would not be punished for what they could not see and promptly donned the blindfolds. Where they could not claim ignorance, they fell back on the claim that everyone was party to a decision, so that no individual could be held squarely to blame.”

[Emphasis in bold added – paragraph 14 of the Conclusions and Recommendations section]

Substitute “Post Office” for “banking industry” and this passage pretty accurately describes the evidence heard by the Williams Inquiry.

What is striking is how much of finance’s worst behaviours was copied. For instance:

• the conflicts of interest – bonuses for criminal investigators based on how much they recovered from subpostmasters;
• a bonus culture unrelated to employees’ conduct. See, for instance, the bonus awarded to a senior employee despite being described by a High Court judge as having sought to “mislead” him (Angela van den Bogerd);
• failing to investigate misconduct (by Angela van den Bogerd);
• ignorance of the front line (not knowing that the Post Office prosecuted staff despite having an 100 strong investigation team, whose budget was presumably signed off at a senior level);
• complicated and poorly understood reporting lines, which diffused responsibility, ensured that emails were sent to many people with no-one having sight of the whole issue and no-one clearly responsible for taking action and seeing matters through. Too many quite senior employees felt able to say that they thought something was someone else’s job with the result that no-one actually did anything effective.

What has worsened has been the behaviour of the lawyers, both internal and external. In 2013 the Parliamentary Commission could write this:

“The professions may not be paragons, but they do at least espouse a strong duty of trust, both towards clients and towards upholding the reputation of the profession as a whole.”

Oh dear! The lawyers’ conduct has been one of the very worst aspects of this affair. The arrogance of Jane McLeod, General Counsel during the Bates litigation, in refusing to attend the Inquiry, sums up the disregard which the lawyers showed for their professional and ethical duties. Lawyers need to have a keen sense of what it is their clients want. But ethical and professional standards mean understanding the difference between giving clients what they want and what the courts / the law / the interests of justice require. Clients need to be told hard truths by their lawyers, even if they may not want this.

If, as Ms Vennells claimed, lawyers were not telling her information she needed to know, it was either because they knew she did not want to know or because they knew (or did not care) that what they and the Post Office were doing was wrong and were trying to give her/the Board some sort of deniability which, coupled with legal privilege, would keep the whole mess under wraps. That some of them are still in position and dealing with the compensation schemes for the people their actions harmed is both insulting and yet another conflict of interest.

It is perhaps unsurprising to find the same sort of behaviour in the Post Office as was prevalent in finance around the same time. There was a widespread belief that if only state owned organisations could adopt the apparently superior practices of – and hire people from – the private sector all would be well. Instead, we got the worst of both worlds. Many of the senior Post Office executives who have given evidence could, with the right suits and haircuts, make a passable impression of the sort of British Leyland managers who appeared so often on TV screens in the 1970’s to explain why the companies they purported to run were so awful and why, nonetheless, yet more government money was needed to keep them going. They too were good at blaming everyone except themselves.

And, as in finance, there was a failure to understand risk and manage it effectively: a failure of both the executives and the in-house and external lawyers. The ignorance shown at all levels of the Post Office of its prosecutorial role, even that it had it, what this required and the risks associated with getting it wrong is astonishing.

If true.

More likely is that they did know of its role but thought it unimportant, something the investigators could be left to get on with with barely any supervision, a hangover from its old-fashioned past and less exciting than the new future flogging financial products through an IT system they did not understand but whose mantra – “Horizon is robust” – they chanted at every opportunity like a child reciting the catechism.

Believing what you would like to be true is a fatal error. It is one which cost the finance sector dearly. It is one which has cost the Post Office. It is one which will cost taxpayers. It is one which has cost its subpostmasters very dearly indeed. It is one which many of its senior executives still seem intent on making, as I explore in Part Two.

Photo by Johnny Briggs on Unsplash

April 13 2024

Senator Howard Baker’s question: “What did the President know and when did he know it?” went to the heart of the Watergate scandal. But it was another question, asked almost as an aside, which provided the damning evidence: the question to Alexander Butterfield, a Nixon aide, about whether, in addition to the taped instructions given by Nixon to his secretary every evening, there were other recording devices in the White House. That “yes” and the content of those tapes provided the evidence that the conspiracy went right to the top and right from the start.

Something similar seems to be happening now in the Post Office Inquiry with the release of numerous recordings, involving conversations between the external investigators, Second Sight, and the Post Office’s General Counsels, Susan Crichton and, later Chris Aujard. Much of the focus has been on what they show about Paula Vennells’ knowledge of Horizon’s failings and its consequences for subpostmasters, contrary to what she later claimed to a Parliamentary Select Committee.

With all the focus on Vennells, her Chairs, Alice Perkins and Tim Parker and the lawyers, we are in danger of ignoring two important areas of interest.

(1) Ignoring the role of those who were in charge long before Ms Vennells became CEO. They were told very specifically of the problems. I have written more here about what Allan Leighton, Chair in 2003 was told by Alan Bates. Mr Bates was also telling others in the Post Office from 2000 onwards. Alas, there are none so deaf as those that don’t want to hear.
(2)  Not asking questions of those further up the chain of command: those who held the purse strings, who owned the company – the government – which had a director representing its interests on the Board.

Some Questions

– How far were the Board’s actions – and failures to act – influenced by the government’s push to make Royal Mail profitable and ready for privatisation?

Remember: by the time of privatisation the majority of the prosecutions, the miscarriages of justice had happened. The Post Office was still part of Royal Mail. The evidence of Sir Michael Hodgkinson this week made it clear that the Post Office was still relying on committees of the Royal Mail Board to do detailed consideration of matters which the Board should have been considering (though how effective this was is open to question). Those in charge of Royal Mail were ultimately responsible.

– Did the Board fail to act because it did not know or want to know?

– Or did it act in the way it did – which looks remarkably like an attempt to cover up what had been happening – because that was what its owner, the government, wanted?

– Is it plausible that Parker, Vennells and others would have acted as they did – from the statements made to Parliament, the instructions to lawyers in relation to the Bates litigation, the evidence given to the court, the decisions made about what not to reveal, the decision to try and get Mr Justice Fraser removed from the case, the involvement of a senior retired Supreme Court judge in that failed venture and so on – if they hadn’t been confident that the government had their backs?

– Was this really a rogue organisation which misled its owners or kept them in the dark throughout this 20 year period while nonetheless managing to persuade it to provide ever increasing amounts of money to fight the subpostmasters and defend it in Parliament?

– And, if so, what does that say about the governance – the competence, curiosity and integrity – of the Business Department and its Ministers over this period?

– Or is it possible that the government, that Ministers and civil servants in the Business Department and elsewhere (remember the Post Office’s Chair, Tim Parker, was also Chair of the Courts and Tribunals Service at the same time as he was authorising his lawyers to try and get the judge thrown off a case involving a company he chaired) knew about – and may have been actively involved in or tacitly or explicitly approved of – the cover up of the miscarriages of justice?

That last is the question which now needs answering. Not avoiding by blaming the whole farrago on Vennells and others, however blameworthy they may be.

A troubling, current, conflict of interest

I have written elsewhere about some odd conflicts of interest which appear not to have troubled the government despite the obviously concerning issues raised. One in particular seems ever more untenable.

How can one of the Post Office’s Board directors also be on the Board of the Crown Prosecution Service, chairing the Risk and Audit Committees of both bodies, given the very real prospect of the former’s ex and current employees being investigated and possibly prosecuted by the latter?

– How can the Business Department and the Ministry of Justice possibly think this is right? Or wise?

– How can they not see that it creates, at best, the perception of a potential conflict of interest and may create an actual conflict of interest in future?

Unless they don’t care? And why might that be?

Will the Williams Inquiry get to the bottom of this? Unlikely. Unless the executives and lawyers now being held out to dry decide to talk freely. What the Business Department was doing, what it knew, what it approved, what it turned a blind eye to, what civil servants knew, what Ministers were or were not told are not within the Terms of Reference. Unsurprisingly.

But we need to know because, bad as this scandal is on the evidence we have seen so far, it would be infinitely worse if it were the government which was in part responsible for the miscarriages of justice and their cover up.

50 years on from Watergate the key question for the government remains: What did it know? When did it know it?