August 4 2023

She had to go. You simply cannot have the CEO of a bank unable to understand that if a journalist asks you about a live story involving confidential details about a bank customer, the only possible response is “I can’t talk to you about that.” Especially not when a few days later you will be presenting the bank’s results and, therefore, are currently in possession of price sensitive market information. If you can’t keep quiet about the former, how can you be trusted with the latter?

What is surprising is that despite, according to reports, having two PR firms (one of them with expertise in “crisis management”) advising the CEO and another one advising the bank, this issue appears to have been handled in a somewhat reactive way, lacking in joined-up thinking or any coherent strategy. It might be wise to remember the advice given to intelligence officers: “A matter is of the highest possible importance and so should be handled at the lowest possible level.” This should never have reached the CEO’s desk in the way it did. And once there, handled better, it goes without saying.

Politicians and commentators have, predictably, piled in, most of them ignoring why she had to go and drawing the wrong lessons from what has happened, or the one which most comfortably suits their prejudices and obsessions, often filtered through whether they approve or disapprove of Farage.

• Kemi Badenoch, the Business Secretary and Minister for Women and Equalities, sought to remind banks that they must remember free speech and not discriminate on the grounds of political belief. She “hoped” banks would remember this. For the Minister for Equalities not to realise that the Equality Act protects “religious or philosophical belief”, political opinions do not automatically come within this category and it is only in Northern Ireland that public sector bodies (not banks) are under a duty to promote equality of opportunity between people with different political opinions is not encouraging.
• Other Tories have given the impression that they are only bothered about this because it happened to Mr Farage. Unwise. Ms Rose’s actions would have been foolish were it any bank customer.
• Farage himself has suggested that there should be a rolling back of AML and PEP requirements.

This would be a mistake. There is always a problem with rules such as these in that the amount of detail and checking needed can make the process so bureaucratic that it is easy to lose sight of what they are for, why this matters and why judgment should never be absent from the process. But ensuring that banks (and other professionals) are not used by bad actors to disguise their actions and give them a wholly undeserved veneer of respectability is essential if Britain’s finance sector is not to become a shady place for shady people, a risk for any significant financial centre.

Importantly, this row is not just or even at all an issue about political beliefs. Banks have obligations to “know their customer” – something considerably more than simply recording their name and address. Anti-Money Laundering rules are onerous, as are those for Politically Exposed Persons. Additionally, banks have to comply with equalities legislation. The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 matters too. Quite considerably, given the various criminal offences banks commit if they fail to comply with it. Balancing all these different legal and regulatory requirements requires a proper understanding of all the relevant rules, overlaid with sound judgment.

Knee-jerk reactions rarely lead to good law, as this article explains more fully. Would that lawmakers understood this basic point.

Above all, banks do need to assess reputational risk – both in relation to who they take on as clients, who they do business with and, critically, how and why they exit them, if their risk appetite changes. This all needs careful consideration and even more careful – and consistent – recording and communication. It is not always easy to get it right. But saying that banks should never take into account the reputation of their customers is as absurd as saying that banks should only take on customers whose political beliefs they approve of.

Farage has also raised the “debanking” issue. Ironically, this might also be described as “inclusivity” – not the woolly-headed “I’d like to teach the world to sing” version so beloved of organisations thinking that the appearance of goodness is all that is needed to demonstrate their “values” – but the tension caused by having private profit-making companies provide vital services without which it is hard to be a fully functioning or contributing member of society: bank accounts / social media / transport / phones / internet access. If everyone needs these, should companies be obliged to provide them regardless of other considerations? And if not, who should?

If only there were a trusted and competent state-owned organisation which could provide such services, something like …. Oooh, I don’t know …. the Post Office? If only.

Darren Jones, the Business Select Committee’s Chair, inadvertently touched on this when he commented on the selectivity of the government’s concerns. He compared its rush to express dismay about NatWest’s behaviour, a company only 38% of which is owned by the government, compared to its silence over the Post Office – 100% owned. The government would do well to heed him on this.

Others (I’m looking at you, Rachel Reeves, Shadow Chancellor) have suggested that Ms Rose was bullied and treated unfavourably because she is a woman. (She did this in an interview in which she admitted not knowing the full story. The irony of saying this when commenting on a CEO talking about a matter on which she had not been fully briefed was apparently lost on her.) It is an easy to make – but ultimately misdirected – point. What do the careers of Cressida Dick and Dido Harding suggest then?

More seriously, it masks a more important point. Even a competent, highly regarded person can make mistakes, sometimes serious and career-ending ones. Even the most effective CEO can panic in a crisis and make elementary and stupid mistakes. One reason for needing strong and effective governance and staff with good judgment at all levels of an organisation is precisely to minimise the risk of this. Or, bluntly, to protect senior managers from their own foolishness. It can seem unfair that one error, even a “serious error of judgment”, should overshadow an otherwise effective career, as if all the achievements are not put – let alone weighed – in the balance. But this is one of the burdens of leadership. And why leaders are paid as well as they are.

It is possible for someone to do a good job overall but still make the sort of mistake that leads to resignation or sacking. That is an important lesson for all of us. No-one is – or should be thought of or think of themselves – as indispensable. That too is an important – if humbling – lesson.

Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

July 31 2023

Delighted to be writing a column for Global Relay. My first one can be found here. 

No prizes for guessing that it’s about turning small problems into crises. Not on purpose, of course. But through indifference, delay and denial.

Extracts from a talk I gave on this topic can be seen here.

Enjoy!

March 18 2023

It is a measure of how seriously the Swiss authorities view Credit Suisse’s position that they are, according to weekend reports, orchestrating a UBS takeover or rescue.

The Terrible Two

It is not the first time that a merger of these banking behemoths has been considered. Last time it was Credit Suisse which considered acquiring UBS when it was in serious difficulties after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. UBS survived, with Swiss government backing, shareholder cash, endless cost-cutting and, eventually, after a revolving door of unmemorable CEO’s for its troubled investment bank, a return to its strengths: wealth and asset management not the chimera of an all-singing, all-dancing full service global bank able to compete with the US. Investment banking was scaled down but focused under Orcel’s leadership. Doing this required not just a reset of its business but its culture, which had underpinned and led to so many of its problems. It took — after some false starts — a decade and a lot of hard work at every level before the changes became effective and properly embedded.

It was not just banks which had to rethink themselves. So did the Swiss financial and political establishment. For the best part of a century, Switzerland’s financial USP was discretion, carefully protected by banking secrecy laws. Or, more bluntly, Swiss banks were where you hid your money, few questions asked. That ended as a result of US fury on discovering how UBS and others, including Credit Suisse (fined $2.6 billion in 2014) had helped US taxpayers evade tax. So the new USP became expertise: put your money in Switzerland not to hide it but because Swiss bankers know how to manage it well.

Credit Suisse’s current travails blow a hole in that. How is it that, despite all the regulatory changes, all the scrutiny, all the lessons learned (surely?), all the training, all the rules, Credit Suisse has got itself into such a mess that its acquisition by its rival is now even in contemplation? And if such a large, important bank can get into such a mess, what does it say about Swiss expertise and, indeed, Swiss regulatory effectiveness?

Blowing the whistle?

One clue may be in the reason for its announcement on 9 March of a delay to its 2022 annual report after a “late call from the US Securities and Exchange Commission” the previous day. Why was the SEC making comments about the “technical assessment of previously disclosed revisions to the consolidated cashflow statements” in 2019 and 2020 and — this is the kicker — “related controls” in March 2023 in a late night call? What or who triggered this? One possibility is that someone escalated this to the SEC because other attempts at escalation and remediation within Credit Suisse had not worked. If correct — if there was a whistleblowing to the SEC — that is very troubling because it suggests either that there were no effective routes for raising concerns within the bank. Or, worse still, that concerns raised were ignored or ineffectively handled. In short, the problem may not just be inadequate financial processes (“material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting” and a management failure to “design and maintain an effective risk assessment process” — oops!). It may also be that the bank’s processes — and culture — for identifying, escalating and handling concerns are inadequate too. If that is the case, what other problems are lurking? This will be bothering Credit Suisse, the Swiss regulator (which was very annoyed by whistleblowing failings in UBS in relation to the FX scandal), the Swiss central bank — and UBS — if it does decide to acquire all or part of its rival. What exactly would it be acquiring?

A Bargain or a Pig in a Poke?

What is in it for UBS? Taking out a competitor, its clients, funds under management and its better employees. Yes — all these. But is an acquisition necessary? Clients and staff will make their own decisions, regardless of what Boards decide. Funds are already flowing out of Credit Suisse, as happened to UBS when it was in trouble.

The risks for UBS are considerable. Bigger is not always better. Absorbing a well-run company is hard enough; absorbing one with difficulties something else entirely. There is every likelihood of plenty more nasties lurking under the carpet. The reputational difficulties will stick to UBS’s name, no matter how often the press releases refer to past Credit Suisse problems. The costs of investigating these — as well as the remediation work necessary to put matters right — will be enormous; not just financially but in management time, energy and enhanced regulatory scrutiny. What will the effect be on the share price? UBS shareholders had a lost decade as UBS cleaned itself up. Are they really willing to finance another clean up, another set of potentially unquantifiable liabilities? Will an acquisition be a distraction from UBS’s own plans and for its current senior management, largely new and brought in to build on what has been achieved by UBS not to clean up another bank’s mess?

Conflicts of interest

There have been plenty of red flags (Greensill, Archegos, Mozambique tuna bonds, GFG, for instance) that all has not been well within Credit Suisse. Some parts (the Compliance department) were well able to identify issues with some of the clients the bank was keen to do business with and warn against this. Despite that those concerns were ignored or, more likely, rationalised away. (Why, for instance, did anyone think it sensible to take on Archegos, an entity set up by someone — Bill Hwang — fined a few years earlier by the SEC for insider dealing?) This suggests an institution with no sound way of managing its risks and the conflicts of interest arising from the desire to do apparently profitable business set against the risks of taking on clients whose adherence to rules is more apparent than real. Changing that is not the work of a moment as Ulrich Koerner, Credit Suisse’s CEO (part of UBS’s senior management team 2009–2022) or its new General Counsel (formerly UBS’ General Counsel 2008–2022) will tell you.

It is not a problem confined to Credit Suisse of course. Questions have been raised about Goldman Sachs’ dual role in relation to Silicon Valley Bank. (It’s not for the first time that Goldmans has faced such questions in relation to M&A deals). Barclays has faced endless issues caused by the tensions between its investment bank and its retail bank, its latest problem arising from its appointment of Jes Staley and the judgment shown by its Board when questions about his relationship with Epstein were raised. (If only the Board and the FCA had taken more seriously Staley’s judgment and failure to understand why whistleblowing matters when concerns were raised in 2017–2018.)

Over the last few decades, the creation of ever larger financial institutions has led to multiple conflicts of interest between the interests of the institution, its clients, between different categories of clients and between different parts of the business. Internal Chinese Walls and oodles of rules sought to recreate what had previously been legal barriers in order to manage those conflicts. Self-regulation and — post the Guinness, Maxwell and Barings scandals — light-touch regulation were meant to do the rest. It did not work. Repeated scandals and harm to the ultimate customers of banks and taxpayers led to more intrusive regulation and ring-fencing — the 21st century’s equivalent of Glass-Steagall. Loopholes have been closed or tried to be anyway. Regulators have been playing Whack-A-Mole with financial institutions ever since. But conflicts of interest are at the heart of all financial scandals. As an official of the US’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Team said when the Vatican Bank did a deal with the US in 2013 “large amounts of money sometimes bring out the worst in people.”

What about governments?

It is not just large banks which have conflicts of interest. Governments have these too. Finance brings in lots of tax revenue. It can be — for a while anyway — a Golden Goose, ready to be plucked for politicians’ favourite projects: banks make money, bankers get paid extraordinarily large sums and consider themselves very clever and worth all this money rather than lucky, politicians get tax revenues and voters get all the goods those revenues pay for without having to pay for any of it themselves. Win-win. Until it all goes Splat! (For those of a more literary bent, the La Fontaine poem about the frog wanting to be a cow — La Grenouille et Le Boeuf — pithily sums up what went wrong.)

While it is all going well, though, politicians fall over themselves to attract such institutions to their country and take especial pride in having ever larger institutions.

• Think of Ireland and its International Finance Centre, which became the location of choice for various dubious German entities, which Ireland then decided to support at vast expense.
• Or Gordon Brown boasting about light-touch regulation for the City in 2004-5.
• Or Alex Salmond and his support for RBS’s ill-fated over-reaching pursuit of ABN AMRO.
• Or, more recently, the support by German politicians and the BaFin, the German regulator, of Wirecard, a German — but apparently cutting edge, global and profitable — fintech entity. A German champion to rival those arrogant Anglo-Saxons! Until it turned out to be so much hot air, fraud and money-laundering.

The desire to have a national financial champion can blind even the most sober of governments and regulators to the risks of letting such companies think themselves indispensable and/or grow too big, unwieldy and, effectively, hard to manage and regulate well.

Two risks

There are only two things which matter about financial institutions, whether large or small, whatever sector they are in: –

1. Do they understand the risks they are managing? This is not a side issue. It is their core work. Managing money — whether it is mortgages, shares, derivatives, loans to business, assets of the wealthy — is all about understanding and managing risk.
2. The only capital that matters is the trust that customers, staff, counterparties, regulators and others have in such an entity. The amount of capital, its liquidity and all the other measures are simply a way of putting figures on this. Once that trust has gone, a bank is finished.

There are serious doubts about Credit Suisse’s ability to understand and manage the risks it is running. What is not yet clear is whether the trust it needs to have the time to sort itself out is still there. Monday may provide an answer.

What Next?

Whatever that answer is and assuming there is no systemic fall-out, governments and regulators (and voters) need to ask themselves whether it is time to rethink whether such large global institutions, however well-capitalised or regulated, are a good idea. If you have institutions with built-in conflicts of interest, you will always have problems, even if systemic risk is avoided. Maybe smaller, more focused entities are best, ones which understand that finance is a service industry, part of an economy’s plumbing, there to serve others not help itself. Maybe global banks — much like other aspects of globalisation — are an idea which needs challenging and rethinking?